Our study examines the effect of country-specific factors on the tone of political campaigns across Europe. Additionally, covering the largest sample of European countries to date it tests the effects of 'usual suspects' in the literature. We use an original dataset of statements made by political actors during 18 electoral campaigns in 9 European countries. Using a multilevel logit model we look at the effects of three country-level variables on campaign tone: type of democracy, party system fragmentation and the polarisation of the electorate. The paper concludes that party system fragmentation and polarisation affects negativity, and parties in consensus democracies are more likely to use neutral tone. Additionally, we find that the effect of the 'usual suspects' derived from single case studies do not prevail systematically. This implies to be very cautious when building on such results, and especially when generalizing American results to European multi-party contexts.
Introduction
The style and quality of public debates contribute to how people think about politicians, parties, and politics in general. It not only affects how people see their own roles in politics and whether or not they participate, but also the level of trust in political institutions and the satisfaction with the political system. It also shows a considerable cross-country variation: in some countries the dominant style of political communication is more civilized and sophisticated, while in other countries harsh advertising prevails. Although it is difficult to judge the overall quality of a country's political communication, one easily detectable aspect is the negativity of political campaigns.
Negative campaigning is considered a campaign technique that is built on attacking political competitors with regards to their personality, views or performance. Although negative campaigning faces considerable criticism, it is considered a viable and regularly used strategy among political parties. Negative messages invite larger media coverage, are shown to be more memorable and are sometimes the only pieces in challenger parties' campaign toolboxes.
The importance of negative campaign is indicated by the large body of literature discussing its effects. It has been shown that negative ads depress turnout (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994) , reduce trust and interest in politics and increase cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997) , polarize voters (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995) and causes decline in campaign discourse (Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 1992) . On the other hand, however, there is also substantial evidence to the contrary (Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 2007) . The literature suggests that the decline in turnout is not that severe as initially thought (Brooks, 2006; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999) , the exposure to negative ads mobilizes voters (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Jackson & Carsey, 2007) , and that negative ads are not only more informative than positive ones (Mark, 2009 ), but they encourage voters to seek out additional information about the candidates (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) . It seems that regarding its effects, negativity is not specifically good or bad, but it definitely influences various aspects of politics. Thus it is essential to know circumstances under which negative campaign prevails.
The literature generally focuses on single-country cases, covering one or few elections. Up to now, there have been very few comparative studies about negative campaigning, and existing work is typically restricted to a maximum of three counties (see for example Desposato, 2008; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, & Boumans, 2011; Walter, 2014) . Additionally, despite the fact that negativity is not only characteristic to America, the vast majority of the studies address the issue of negative campaigning in the context of the US elections, which leads to a one-sided development of theories in the field (Walter, 2014, p. 43) . Contributing to the ever-growing literature on negative campaign, the aim of this paper is to understand if country-level factors indeed affect negativity and whether or not existing theories can be applied to political contexts outside the US.
The reason for neglecting the country-level driving factors of negative campaign lies most probably in the lack of proper comparative data: the construction of campaign datasets is extremely time and effort intensive, and data collection can hardly be carried out without -preferably -native country expert coders. The Comparative Campaign Dynamics Dataset (Debus, Somer-Topcu, & Tavits, 2016) overcomes this obstacle by describing electoral campaigns based on a standardised coding scheme in nine European countries at two elections each, covering the widest range of cases compared to any former comparative study about the driving factors of negative campaigning. The sample is sufficiently large to test not only party-, but system-level hypotheses, which strongly contributes to the understanding of negative campaigning in a comparative context. The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly summarise the literature on negative campaigning and we formulate our hypotheses, which is followed by the description of the data and variables at hand. After this, we move on with the analysis of the data. In the concluding section we summarise the findings and raise implications for future research in the field.
Theoretical framework
Negative campaigning has long been considered an attractive strategy of gaining attention, media coverage and votes. In recent years, the increase in negativity is registered not only in the US (Fowler & Ridout, 2013; Geer, 2012; Kathleen H. Jamieson, Waldman, & Sherr, 2000; Johnston & Kaid, 2002) , but worldwide too (Ceron & d'Adda, 2016; Curini, 2011; Momoc, 2010; Sullivan, 2008 Sullivan, , 2009 . Although voters may not find negativity appealing (Carraro, Gawronski, & Castelli, 2010; Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Jasperson & Fan, 2002) , and the evidence about the effectiveness of negative campaigns is mixed, there are some good reasons for parties to apply this strategy. First of all, negative campaign messages dampen the positive characteristics of the opponents and they are considered to be more memorable (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Lau, 1985; Perloff & Kinsey, 1992) . Secondly, they are sometimes the only tool for competitors to draw voter and media attention (Nooy & Kleinnijenhuis, 2013) . Mark (2009) suggests that challengers have no other choice but to criticise incumbent parties to point out the flaws in policies and offer alternatives. Accordingly, Lau and Pomper (2002) show that candidate status might matter in how negative messages affect voters: negative campaigning is better for challengers, while incumbents might want to campaign with positive ads.
Thirdly, Mattes and Redlawsk (2015) argue that voters are not always negative about negativity. While personal attack is likely to backfire, voters accept negativity about party programs or ideological positions (Carraro & Castelli, 2010) . Mark (2009) argues that if they are presented 'in a factual manner' voters value information on differences between parties, and establishing clear differences between competitors is easily done by applying negativity. Furthermore, contrary to positive messages (Mark, 2009 ) by providing valuable information negative ads significantly lower the information cost of voting (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Geer, 2006; Mattes & Redlawsk, 2015; Sullivan, 2009 ).
Anyhow, negative campaigning might be a strategic decision based on its expected utility relative to the possible downsides (Peterson & Djupe, 2005) . The utility of such strategies often depends on institutions and the political context. Under certain circumstances, negative campaign tone pays off, while under different incentives parties have to refrain from attacking others. Therefore, the level of negativity in a country is very well the function of some macro-level characteristics combined with party level features. Due to the lack of comparative data, however, when studying the determinants of negative campaigning, the literature discusses mostly micro-level (candidate, party and campaign-level) features, and country-level explanatory factors have mostly remained out of the reach of investigation. Therefore, any study that wishes to theorise the effect of countrylevel factors on negative campaigning can only rely on very few comparative works and the often contradicting results of single-country studies.
The first thing that comes to mind when characterising political systems is their position on the consensual-majoritarian continuum. Although the sample of Walter (2014) covers only three countries (i.e. the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom), and thus provides variation that hardly leads to conclusive results, negativity appears to be associated with the type of democracy. The findings suggest that more consensual contexts seem to make negative advertising less profitable. Cooperation and negotiation are the cornerstones of consensual democracy (Lijphart, 1999) , which clearly provide a weak breeding ground for negativity.
H1. The likelihood of negativity is smaller in consensual democracies.
Furthermore, as consensual democracies tend to produce often fragmented multi-party systems, parties have to take coalition strategies into account when setting the tone of their campaigns. As Walter and Van der Brug (2013) and Hansen and Pedersen (2008) highlight, in a multi-party context where coalition governments prevail, negative advertising might be beneficial to maximise votes, but it is not an effective office-seeking strategy. Going negative against prospective coalition partners is unproductive, as it makes the future cooperation difficult, and it reduces the chances of the sender to be included in a governing coalition. Moreover, multi-party contexts offer less incentives to use negativity. In a two-party context, negative campaign yields votes to the sender, or alternatively, decrease the mobilisation potential of the competitor. However, in a multi-party system, demobilising the target party's voting base does not automatically guarantee a larger vote share (Hansen & Pedersen, 2008; Ridout & Walter, 2015; Walter & Van der Brug, 2013) .
Nevertheless, the literature also makes a contradicting argument in connection with the effect of party system fragmentation. Evidence suggest that the higher the number of quality competitors (Peterson & Djupe, 2005) , and the more close the race, the more candidates and parties are willing to go negative (Desposato, 2008; Hale, Fox, & Farmer, 1996; Wicks & Souley, 2003) . Others, on the other hand, find no evidence at all regarding fragmentation (Walter, Van der Brug, & van Praag, 2014) . Based on these, we argue that the effect of party system fragmentation is not linear. To ensure the continuity of governance parties should minimise the potential for conflict within the coalition. All else being equal, the potential for conflict is the smallest with the smallest number of parties participating in the coalition that still has a stable majority. Thus, one could expect that the incentive for negativity decreases with the increasing number of parties in the party system only up to the point where it gets too fragmented to maintain stable coalitions. After this point, more parties produce more negativity, as there are more parties that are not needed in a coalition.
H2: Party system fragmentation decreases negativity when the number of parties in the party system is not large, and increases negativity in the case of extremely fragmented party systems.
An additional important country-level factor is the polarisation of the electorate. Ideological distance between competitors may play a role in the negativity of campaigns, but different theories exist regarding the direction of relationship between these two phenomena, and there is almost no research directly tackling this question (for an example see Geer, 2006) . Studies about the US recurrently find evidence to a growing level of political animosity in the electorate, and in the last decades both negative advertising and partisan polarisation between Democrats and Republicans became more intensive. As Hetherington (2008) theorises, negativity is a by-product that accompanies polarisation. His argument is that 'a polarized system provides a chance for those competing for power to make a clearer case for why they should be given power. Of course, the other side can point to the risks associated with that position as well. As a result, this struggle can get nasty-and at times the rhetoric will cross the line of civility ' (2008, pp. 38-39) . Testing a similar hypothesis on data from the US between 1980 and 2000, Geer (2006, pp. 148-53) shows that polarisation largely explains the level of negativity. This would lead to a hypothesis about a positive relationship between ideological polarisation and negativity, but we argue that in a multi-party context the opposite is more plausible.
Spatial models of rational choice theory suggest that negativity may be an effective tool to gain votes from ideologically similar parties without altering the party's ideological position. As Doron and On (1983, p. 221) put it : 'parties should attack each other if and only if they identify themselves as located on the same market'. Therefore, if the electorates of two or more parties are largely overlapping, and voters see little ideological difference between them, it is crucial for the parties to point out the shortcomings of their competitors. This is especially true for valence characteristics, as attacking the competitors along these lines may create a moral advantage that could define the outcome of the election (Carraro et al., 2010, p. 462; Curini, 2011; Curini & Martelli, 2010) . Using data on Dutch electoral campaigns Walter (2012) shows that ideologically proximate parties are indeed more probable targets of negative messages, and Curini (2011) comes to similar conclusions analysing data from Italy and Japan. Thus, we argue that in a European context characterised by multi-party competition the prevalence of negativity is lower in ideologically more polarised systems.
H3: The likelihood of negativity decreases with increasing polarisation.

Data and variables
Our analysis relies on the content analysis of newspaper articles covering one month before the national elections in nine European countries. Consequently, it focuses on a period of intense campaigning and high media attention on politics. Data is taken from the Comparative Campaign Dynamics Dataset (Debus et al., 2016) . The text corpus includes front page articles and a random 5% sample of all election related articles (but at least 60) from a right-and a left-leaning daily newspaper in each participating country. The sample covers 9 countries, 18 elections and 1128 articles, and includes elections between 2005 and 2010. These nine countries offer a sample with sufficient variation in terms of geographical, cultural and political features. Table 1 contains the list of participating countries, elections and newspapers. Coders were asked to indicate how confident they were about their coding decisions. To ensure reliability, the final dataset includes only statements which have been coded with a high confidence and agreement rate. For more details on the data see Baumann and Gross (2016) .
Dependent variable
In our paper we test the effects of various independent variables on statement tone, paying special attention to negativity. Statement tone is measured on a nominal scale and differentiates between (1) negative, (2) neutral and (3) . Second, to control for party system fragmentation we include the CPDS variable on the effective number of parties at the elections calculated based on Laakso and Taagepera (1979) 4 . To account for the non-linear effect of this variable we include its squared form into our model. Third, the polarisation of the electorate is taken into account. We utilise the ideological position (left-right) variable (measures on the 0 -10 scale) from the European Social Survey (Norwegian Centre for Research Data, 2004) , and calculate the distance of medians of left-(0 -4) and right-wing (6 -10) blocks in each country. Respondents who put themselves to the middle (5) are excluded.
Control variables
To be able to show the net effect of macro-level variables, we include several control variables into our model. We control for the 'usual suspects' of the literature and for variables that are specific to our data. When studying the determinants of negative campaigning, the literature discusses mostly micro-level (candidate, party and campaign-level) features. Micro-level factors are generally broken down into sender and target level characteristics. Sender level characteristics are features of parties who use negativity as a campaign tool, while target level characteristics are properties of parties who get attacked by negative messages. In our paper, the focus is on the circumstances under which parties may opt to negativity. As our questions concern the behaviour of the 'active participant', and not the target of negativity, we look only at sender level variables.
First and foremost, we control for government status (0 -challenger, 1 -government). The literature suggest that incumbents tend to focus on the achievements of the previous electoral term, challengers try to point out the flaws of incumbents (see among others Elmelund-Praestekaer, 2010; Hale et al., 1996; Nooy & Kleinnijenhuis, 2013; Sullivan & Sapir, 2012; Theilmann & Wilhite, 1998; Walter, 2012) . Party size is measured with the share of seats the party held at the previous parliament. Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) argues that small parties are more likely to attack large ones, while others find no effect (Nooy & Kleinnijenhuis, 2013; Walter & Van der Brug, 2013) . A further important factor in the literature is time. It is argued that with the elections approaching incentives to go negative increases (Damore, 2002; Haynes & Rhine, 1998) .
Additionally, we control for the parties' ideological positions, measured on a left-right scale (0 -10), the newspapers political leaning (0 -left, 1 -right), statement type (0 -position issue, 1 -valence issue), the election (0 -first election coded in the country, 1 -second election), the region (0 -Western Europe, 1 -Eastern Europe) and whether or not the statement was made about another party (0 -statement about self, 1 -statement about another party). Information on government status, party size and party ideology come from the Parliaments and Governments (Döring & Manow, 2016) dataset. For the full list of variables see Appendix 2.
Analysis
To test the effects of the independent variables on statement tone we used generalised structural equation modelling to build a multilevel logit model with multinomial outcome (negative, neutral and positive statements) 5 . Statements and countries constitute the two levels. We assume shared random effects, meaning that we allow the country-level intercepts to vary, but the effect sizes remain the same across all countries. Additionally, we chose negative tone as the control category for our dependent variable. This way, we are able to assess the prevalence of both neutral and positive tones relative to negative statements. With other words, we uncover the circumstances under which parties chose either neutral or positive messages instead of negative ads. The reason why we decided to separate non-negative statements into positive and neutral ones and not to differentiate between negative and non-negative ads is that we suspected (and our analysis confirmed it), that there is a difference between directional and non-directional (i.e. neutral) statements, which effect would have remained unrevealed if we had merged neutral and positive messages. Results of our main model are shown in Table 2 . 6 5 Stata function: gsem (y x1 x2… xk M(country)@1), mlogit 6 To test the robustness of our results, we checked the prevalence of the reported effects under various different model specifications. Applying a 0 -1 dependent variable (0 -non-negative, 1 -negative) the direction of the reported country-effects remain unchanged. Additionally, the step-by-step removal of the control variables does not change the effect and significance of the country variables. Choosing country-election as the Level-2 variable, does also not change the results. As to the robustness of control variable effects, party size and government appear to modify each other's effects. However, excluding each from the model does not change country-level effects. Furthermore, as a result of the step-by-step removal of controls from the model, the election and the time until the election variables are not always significant, but consistently point to the same direction.
Table 2. Two-level multinomial logistic regression results with shared random effects explaining statement tone
Taking a look at the predictive margins, all variables set to their means, the probability of a statement being negative is 0.62 as opposed to 0.06 and 0.32 in the cases of neutral and positive ones respectively. It is no surprise that the probability of negative messages is significantly larger in the case of parties targeting others (0.9) than parties talking about themselves (0.1).
Looking at the effect of type of democracy (H1) moving from the most majoritarian end (the UK in 2005) of the scale toward maximum consensus (the Netherlands in 2010), the probability of negativity hardly changes. Parallelly, the probability of neutral messages increases with increasing consensus, from 0.02 to 0.11 at the two extremes of the majority vs. consensus scale. Most surprisingly, however, the consensus type of democracy decreases the probability of positive messages from 0.36 to 0.28. Therefore, it seems that parties in consensual democracies consider neutrality as the alternative of positive messages when they talk about themselves : while parties in majority democracies tend to go positive about themselves, consensus democracy keeps parties -2858.935 *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 Dependent variable: statement tone (1 = negative, 2 = neutral, 3 = positive) Level-1: statement, Level-2: country Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses neutral in this regard Looking at these results, we conclude that our first hypothesis is not confirmed: consensus democracy does not constrain negativity.
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of statement tone in light of type of democracy
As to our second hypothesis, namely the non-linear effect of party system fragmentation on the likelihood of negativity, results appear to support our argument. Disentangling the effect of the squared term Figure 2 shows that negativity decreases with increasing fragmentation only to a point, from where it starts to increase. In the first segment of the graph, the level of negativity is relatively high. Looking at the level of fragmentation, these are elections where one-party governments are likely to be formed. As fragmentation increases, -and with that the likelihood of setting up a oneparty government decreases -, the probability of sending negative messages decreases. On the third part of the figure, the effect of excessive fragmentation on negativity shows that once there are too many parties competing, negativity again becomes an inviting tool. Figure 2 The predicted probability of negative tone in light of party system fragmentation With regards to our third hypothesis, polarisation makes a difference in choosing between positive and negative campaign messages, and the effect points to the expected direction. As Figure 3 suggests, increasing polarisation decreases negativity while it increases the occurrence of positive ads. Thus, the role of polarisation in European parties' campaign strategy is in line with the prediction of rational models (Doron & On, 1983) . This is just the opposite of what has been found in the US, where polarisation and negativity increase hand in hand (Geer, 2006) . At last, although macro-level variables -especially party system fragmentation -significantly change the probability of the different types of messages, we must stress that this does not change the picture in the absolute sense. Although its exact prevalence is dependent on a wide range of factors, negativity is still the dominant alternative parties choose. Although focusing on a different time period, this result contradicts the findings of Kaid and Holtz-Bacha (2006, p. 454) namely that in a large number of democracies -with the exception of the US -campaigns between 1988 and 2004 tended to be rather positive.
Turning to the 'usual suspects' of the literature and the effects of other control variables, the party's government status, party size, statement type, time until the elections, region and the election have significant effects on statement tone. Compared to the challengers, government parties are more likely to make positive comments than negative ones. This result contradicts to the widely shared theory about 'challengers as risk-takers' (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2009, p. 352) ; however, based on the predicted probabilities presented in Appendix 3, the effect is rather tiny.
Regarding party size, the larger the party, the greater the probability of their politicians to make negative statements instead of positive ones. Indeed, the probability of negative statements goes up (from 0.59 to 0.66), whereas the probability of positive messages goes down (from 0.34 to 0.28).This result is again in contrast with the general assumption which associates negativity to smaller party size, but it is in line with the rational model of campaign negativity suggested by Doron and On (1983) .
Additionally, the closer we get to the elections, the larger the likelihood of positive messages as opposed to negative ones. While we know that the timing of negativity is dependent upon many dynamic elements, including the negativity of the competitors' campaign or polling results, this is again in contrast with the popular notion that campaigns are generally more positive at the beginning, and they turn to be more negative with the approaching of the Election Day.
Our results also weaken the strain of literature which claims that negativity is increasing worldwide. In fact, in our sample, more recent elections show significantly less negativity and more neutrality and positivity. This result, however, underpins the arguments of Vliegenthart and his co-authors (2011, pp. 107-108) who propose to explain trends in negativity with case-specific factors instead of with general political trends. Additionally, we find that parties are more likely to go negative in connection with policy issues than general valence content, and last but not least, Eastern European parties prefer neutral tone as opposed to negative messages. To sum up, our results do not offer support for the majority of usual suspects in the literature.
Conclusions
The aim of this study was twofold. Firstly, we investigated if country-specific variables are important predictors of the tone of political campaigns in Europe. Secondly, by controlling for a wide range of micro-level factors, we contribute to the advancement of the field also with testing the 'usual suspects' of the literature utilizing a particularly wide sample of European countries and elections.
We tested the effect of three country-level variables on the negativity of campaigns: the consensusmajoritarian features of democracy, party system fragmentation, and the polarisation of the electorate. To test our hypotheses we used a unique dataset of statements made by political actors before the elections in 18 electoral campaigns in 9 European countries. We applied a multilevel logit model with multinomial outcome to explain the tone of the statements made by political actors. Our dependent variable distinguished between positive, neutral and negative tone. We found that country-level factors indeed affect the probability of going negative. In line with our hypothesis, first, the likelihood of negativity decreases with increasing fragmentation only to take a U-turn in the case of excessive fragmentation. The consensus/majoritarian features also affect the tone of messages, but the effect is rather moderate: more consensual democracies present somewhat more neutrality in campaign messages, leaving the level of negativity virtually unchanged. And lastly, in polities with less polarised electorates political actors are more likely to choose positive strategies instead of negative ones.
With regards to micro-level factors, we found that these characteristics matter in establishing campaign tone, but some of the results are not in line with the expectations derived from the literature. First, supporting the findings of Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis (2013) and Walter and Van der Brug (2013) we find no support for the hypothesis that smaller parties are more negative than larger ones. In fact, in our sample larger parties are significantly more likely to apply negative ads than smaller ones.
Secondly, the first set of campaigns (between 2005 and 2010) were found significantly more negative than the campaigns between 2010 and 2014, which is not in line with the popular claim in the literature that campaigns become more and more negative. Furthermore, our results suggest that the closer we get to Election Day, the less we can expect negativity to occur. This is evidence against the argument that parties use negative messages to mobilize voters just before the elections.
These results call the attention to a very important issue with regards to the literature on negative campaigning. While in single-country studies these variables had either large or opposite effects, our results suggest that once a larger pool of cases are taken into account, the effects either diminish (i.e. government status) or are proven to be reversed (i.e. party size, the number of days left until the election). This implies that connections between a wide range of variables and negativity rest upon the context in which campaigns are investigated. It is also important to note that the majority of these 'usual suspects' have empirical support in analyses carried out in the political context of the US. Based on our results we suggest to be very cautious when building theory based on evidence found in single-case studies, and especially when generalizing American results to European multiparty contexts.
As usual, our study has also its limitations. Most importantly, the choice of analysing newspaper articles is crucial in evaluating our results. As they are shown to reach a larger amount of voters, television and the internet are two sources that also needs attention in the future. Additionally, mainstream media might discriminate niche parties which introduces bias into the sample.
To conclude, while we could not confirm some currently popular assumptions about micro-level factors, our results point to a relatively large effect of country-level variables on the probability of negativity. These factors change the probability of negative ads at least as much (if not more) as micro-level variables. Therefore, it is grounded to investigate the topic from a comparative perspective in the future, and focus on the institutional determinants of negative campaigning.
